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The  presence  of  organized  crime  is  a  pervasive  feature  of  many  developed  and  developing 
countries.  Even  if  ‘mafia’  organizations  have  greatly  enlarged  the  geographical  scope  of  their 
activities, as in the past they are still deeply rooted in specific territories where their presence 
generates a host of influences on socio-economic performances (perverse social capital). In this 
paper  we  analyse  the  consequences  of  the  presence  of  organized  crime  on  the  long-term 
accumulation of human capital, a key determinant of economic growth. To do this we build a 
unique dataset where – among other information – we identify municipalities where the presence of 
organized crime is particularly pervasive in an Italian region, Calabria, where is based one of the 
most  powerful  international  criminal  organization,  ‘Ndrangheta.  Our  results  suggest  that  the 
presence of organized crime inhibits the accumulation of human capital both directly (reducing the 









Kewords: Organized crime, human capital, social capital, migration 
JEL Classification: J61, J24, O15, O18 
 
                                                 
♦ Corresponding author: Nicola Coniglio, Dept. of Economics, University of Bari, Via Rosalba n.53, 70124 Bari 
(Italy), email address: nicola.coniglio@snf.no. We wish to thank participants at the following seminars and conferences 
for  useful  comments  and  suggestions:  Nihon  University  (Tokyo,  Japan),  Hokkaido  University  (Sapporo,  Japan), 
European Regional Science Association Conference (Liverpool, UK), Staffordshire University (Stoke-on-Trent, UK), 
London School of Economics, Ch. Michelsen Institute (Bergen, Norway). The usual disclaimer applies.    2 
1.  Introduction 
 
   
 
    The economics literature has had a longstanding interest in analysing the phenomenon of crime 
and especially its determinants and costs for society (Becker 1968 and Becker and Stigler 1974). 
However little attention has been devoted to the study of the long term consequences of crime. In 
particular most of the literature has focussed on criminal activities in general, while organised crime 
has  received  less  attention  comparatively.  Although  organized  crime  is  a  ubiquitous  and 
increasingly relevant phenomenon affecting both developed and developing countries, in fact we 
know  very  little  on  the  long  term  effects  in  the  geographical  areas  where  these  criminal 
organizations  operate.  Surely  several  authors  have  pointed  out  that  the  presence  of  (violent) 
organized crime coexists usually with under or limited development (Centorrino et al 1999; Goglio 
2004; Zamagni 1993), but the channels through which this happens and the direction of causality 
between crime and limited development are not understood very well yet. 
    This paper represents a first attempt in filling this gap in the rapidly growing literature of the 
economics of criminal activity in general and of organized crime in particular. We want to shed 
some light on how the presence of deeply rooted criminal organization affects the growth and the 
accumulation of one of the most fundamental factors of economic development: Human Capital. 
We investigate whether the presence of the “Mafia” and other similar criminal organization has any 
effect on individuals’ economic incentives to invest in their own education in order to increase their 
future income. Methodologically we adopt a similar approach to Peri (2004). To analyse the long 
term impact of the organized crime we take a long term perspective and assess the change in the 
stock of human capital between 1971 and 2001, using census data. However, instead of data at 
provincial level like most of the authors studying the interaction between crime and economy (Peri 
2004 and Buonanno et al 2006), we use data at municipal level.  
To  conduct  our  analysis,  we  focus  our  attention  on  an  extremely  well  developed  and 
aggressive kind of organized crime in Italy, ‘Ndrangheta, deeply rooted in Calabria, one of the 
Italian southern regions. Calabria is the poorest region in Europe and ‘Ndrangheta is, together with 
the Sicilian Mafia (i.e. “Cosa nostra”) the most ancient criminal organization in Italy. It has strong 
links with the territory especially in the forms of family ties and, maybe rather surprisingly, is the 
most powerful Italian criminal organization today, with an estimated annual turnover between 36 
and  55  billions  of  Euros,  approximately  3%  of  the  Italian  GDP  in  2007  (Eurispes  2008, 
Masciandaro  2008).  Therefore  represents  in  our  opinion  a  very  well  suited  case  study  for  our 
research question. 
The novelty in our empirical strategy consists in building a database of municipalities where 
we can be confident up to a reasonable degree that the ‘Ndrangheta has been historically present 
and well developed for quite a long time and does not represent a new phenomenon. Therefore we 
are able to investigate the long term effects of this presence.  
We find evidence of a negative “Godfather effect” on human capital accumulation which 
seems to operate through two main channels: (i) the presence of a negative incentive to acquire 
formal education; (ii) a significant migration from territories where the presence of organized crime 
is  strong.  An  interesting  aspect  which  characterizes  Calabria,  together  with  other  Mezzogiorno 
regions, is the presence of “arbereshe” communities who fled Albania and settled in the South of 
Italy between the XV and XVIII century, mainly after the death of the Albanian national hero 
Giorgio  Castriota  Scanderberg,  in  order  to  escape  the  Ottoman  invasion  of  Albania. 
Notwithstanding  the  centuries  that  passed  since  their  initial  settlement  these  communities  still 
preserve  their  ethnic  and  linguistic  cultural  traits.  A  by-product  of  our  research,  one  we  deem 
worthy of further investigation, is that the presence of local “good” social capital in the form of 
cohesion within this ethnic and linguistic minorities seems to have a positive effect in the process of   3 
human capital formation, and seems to have worked as a shelter to the infiltration within the local 
society of organized crime. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the extensive control of mafias on 
their local territories and the potential effects of this perverse form of social capital on human 
capital formation. In Section 3 we present a brief overview of the literature on the determinants of 
organized crime and its negative economic effects. The case analysed in this paper is presented in 
Section 4. Firstly we describe the criminal organization known as ‘Ndrangheta; then we discuss the 
empirical approach, data employed and main results. Conclusive remarks and potential avenue for 




2.  The local dimension of organized crime and its effects on human capital accumulation 
 
Crime in general is understood as a human activity posing a threat to the orderly and peaceful 
conduct of human business and, more generally, human life. Organized crime according to several 
authors (see Paoli 2002 and literature therein referenced) possesses two additional features: (i) the 
provision of illegal goods and services; (ii) a stable organization - with its own human, financial and 
capital resources - engaged in illegal activities with a well-defined collective identity, internal rules 
and subdivision of work among its members. Such organizations have several features in common 
with productive (legal) firms; in fact the common scope of their activities is that of generating 
profits.  As  private  firms,  criminal  organizations  undertake  investments  in  physical  and  human 
capital, decide whether to expand or not the range of products/services, extend their “market” both 
nationally and abroad (and become “multinational organizations”). Contrarily to legal firms, the 
rules which regulates the internal functioning of the organizations and its interactions with the 
external world are based on the use of violence (or the mere threat of violence).  
    Organized crime is characterized by the existence of a hierarchical and structured institution, able 
to expand its ties in the business world and in the political realm, capable of dealing with the 
conflicts  emerging  between  its  members  and  the  different  sub-groups  the  organized  crime 
institution is made of. Furthermore the organized crime institution not only conducts its business by 
enforcing its rules in a violent way, not only it does squeeze and extort money and income from 
several citizens, but it supplies them with “law”, “order” and “security” in the territories where its 
presence is stronger. These organizations in order to maintain a strong grip over the “home area”  
often invest real resources in search of legitimization and consensus among the population (creation 
of a mafia culture). In this case crime is not (only) a cause or an effect or a manifestation of a 
difficult social situation, like the usual violent crime: it becomes instead a completely different way 
of organizing a vast part of the social, human and economic interactions between individuals and 
(legal and illegal) institutions.     
  The trans-national dimension of mafia activities is considered as one of the main future 
challenges  for  governments  and  international  institutions.  According  to  the  United  Nations 
“organized crime is one of the major threats to human security, impeding the social, economic, 
political and cultural development of societies worldwide”. But although the scale of their operation 
is more and more taking place across borders, the criminal organization needs a well defined local 
dimension, a territory where to base itself in order to conduct its own different illegal activities. 
Several authors have noticed that controlling the territory and especially the municipalities endows 
the organized crime with the best possible option to do so: the nature of organized crime in general 
and  particularly  of  Italian  organized  crime  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  control  of  local  territory, 
especially at the municipal level. This “glocal” dimension of the organised crime is even more true 
nowadays in an extremely integrated world (Forgione 2009; Gratteri and Nicaso 2009). Since even 
in the same province very close municipalities may have a very different situation regarding the 
presence of the organized criminality, we think that it is the municipality, rather than the province,   4 
the unit of investigation better suited to our investigation: it will be at this level that the persistence 
of Mafia-like organizations will explicate their most powerful and negative effect. 
According to Coleman (1988) social capital has two main components: (i) a social structure; 
(ii) facilitation of certain beneficial actions within the structure which are not necessarily beneficial 
to others. Strong and deeply rooted criminal organizations - such as the one object of our analysis, 
the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta – might be considered as a perverse form of social capital. The link 
between social capital and human capital has received some attention within the economic literature 
(see La Porta et al 1997, Papagapitos and Riley 2009) but it has been confined only to “beneficial” 
forms of social capital.  
The presence of organized crime might have strong effects on the accumulation of human 
capital through two main channels. Firstly, organized crime by severely distorting the functioning 
of  the  local  economy  and  society  might  induce  individuals  to  emigrate  from  areas  where  the 
phenomenon  is  particularly  intense  and  pervasive  (‘Human  flights’  effects).  The  literature  on 
migration has long established that individuals with a higher endowment of human capital – highly 
skilled, talented  and educated individuals  – are more sensitive to geographical differences in 
economic opportunities and/or quality of life (Chiswick 1999; Borjas et al 1992; Florida 2005). The 
presence  of  organized  crime  would  hence  boost  the  incentive  to  migrate  particularly  for  these 
individuals  within  the  population.  Secondly,  a  dis-incentive  effect  might  be  at  work  when  this 
perverse  form  of  social  capital  is  particularly  abundant.  Human  capital  -  skills  and  knowledge 
acquired by human beings - is mainly the result of individual investments in education and training 
activities. In turn, the individual incentive to invest in human capital depends on subjective costs 
and benefits associated to this choice: the presence of organized crime might severely affects (and 
hence distort) these individual decisions by altering both the costs and benefits, in particular by 




3.  On the determinants of (organized) crime and its economic and social costs 
 
In the last five decades, the relationship between crime and economics has been investigated 
employing different approaches and perspectives. Whereas in the 1950s’ and 1960s’ the dominant 
paradigm among social scientists was the explanation of crime in terms of mental illness and social 
oppression, Gary Becker (1968) was in the forefront of those considering criminal behaviour as 
dictated  by  rational  choices.  By  applying  the  analytical  apparatus  of  economic  optimization  to 
crime, Becker showed that illegal conduct is the outcome of a cost-benefit evaluation balancing 
pecuniary (and non pecuniary) rewards from crime compared to legal activities, the probability of 
arrest and conviction, and the strictness of penalty. Following studies (Stigler, 1970; Becker and 
Stigler, 1974; Landes and Posner, 1975) extended the economic approach to crime in order to 
define the optimal enforcement of laws in a social context aiming to deter criminal behaviour but, at 
the same time, to minimize social costs of dissuasion. Building on Becker’s approach, Ehrilch 
(1973) developed a more comprehensive model in which the choice to engage in legal or illegal 
activities was assimilated to occupational responses to incentives and economic opportunities under 
uncertainty; the empirical implementation of the model showed - other than the statistical relevance 
of law enforcement as deterrent to criminal behaviour - a significant association between the rate of 
(specific) crimes and income inequality.  
In effect, later studies have emphasized that income inequality, unemployment and the level 
of  education  are  crucial  factors  conditioning  criminal  decisions.  Freeman  (1994,  1996,  2000) 
provided evidence of the costs of inequality in the United States during the 1980s in terms of high 
level of crime by less educated (young and black) workers, despite the rising trend in incarceration 
in the same period. Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) carried out a more systematic empirical 
analysis to test if the trend in labour market conditions for young, unskilled American workers –   5 
characterized by a deterioration in the 1980s and an improvement in the 1990s – could be explained 
by the reverse pattern followed by crime rates in the two decades. They found that especially wages, 
compared to unemployment, were significantly associated with crime
1. Machin and Meghir (2004) 
focussed on the United Kingdom case (in particular on England and Wales in the period 1975-96) 
and found a similar relationship: a decline in the remunerations of low-wages workers induced an 
increase in crime rates.  
Although less investigated compared to the effect of labour market conditions (also because 
it  is  indirectly  captured  by  them),  the  level  of  education  plays  a  fundamental  role  in  criminal 
decisions. From a theoretical point of view, many channels suggest that an increase in educational 
attainment should induce a decline in the probability of being involved in illegal activities
2. First, 
schooling leads to higher wage rates and therefore to higher opportunity cost of crime. Moreover, in 
the case of punishment, the time out of the labour market due to incarceration is more costly for 
high (more educated) earners. In addition, social discredit associated with conviction extends the 
negative impact on earnings beyond the time spent in prison and this reputational repercussion is 
stronger among white collars (Kling, 1999). Second, education may affect time preferences (Becker 
and Mulligan, 1997) and tastes for crime (Arrow, 1997). In other words, more schooling increases 
the  patience  of  individuals  and  their  risk  aversion  and  this  should  lead  to  a  more  careful 
consideration  of  the  probable  penalty  associated  with  crime,  other  than  the  psychic  costs  of 
violating the law. Third, if criminal behaviour is affected by path dependence - the probability of 
offending today depends on the offences accumulated in the past - school attendance and time spent 
in education should divert from crime (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003).  
On the side of empirical analysis,  Lochner and Moretti (2004) provided empirical evidence 
of the negative link between education and crime in the case of United States. Using Census and 
FBI data, they found that schooling diminishes the probability of apprehension and incarceration 
and this outcome is due to changes in criminal behaviour.  
In  general,  the  contributions  on  economic  approach  to  crime  shortly  reviewed  so  far  - 
although they differ widely in methods and specific research questions - share in common the same 
causal direction, that one moving from socio-economic factors (incentives and opportunities, wage 
inequality, unemployment, education, etc.) to criminal behaviour.  
It  is  evident  that  the  reverse  causal  link  is  equally  relevant  in  the  real  word.  In  many 
countries economic activities managed by organized crime are pervasive and have a significant 
effect on socio-economic structure (see, for example, some areas of Italian Mezzogiorno). However, 
when  we  want  to  assess  the  channels  through  which  (organized)  crime  has  an  impact  on  the 
economy – for example, in terms of misallocation of resources or long run effects on growth – 
literature support  is less abundant. 
Baumol (1990)  provided historical evidence to suggest that differences in allocation - and 
not  in  total  supply  -  of  entrepreneurship  between  productive  activities  (such  innovation)  and 
unproductive activities (such as organized crime, military activity or rent seeking) are crucial in 
order to determine the relative degree of innovativeness of a society compared to another one. The 
presence of organized crime by changing the structure of relative rewards in the society affects the 
allocation of talents in productive/unproductive activities. According to Baumol, policy makers can 
play a key role in the transformation of society by changing the rules of the games influencing 
relative payoffs.  
Acemoglu (1995) extended Baumol’s hypothesis and provided a less optimistic view on the 
role of policy as factor of social change. In Acemoglu’s model the reward structure influences 
allocation  of  talents  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  depends  on  how  talents  are  distributed  between 
                                                 
1 Levitt (2004) focussed on the factors explaining the decline in crime in the 1990s in the United States. Four causes are 
relevant for Levitt: increases in the number of police, rising prison population, receding crack consumption, the 
legalization of abortion.   
2 In general,  it is more reasonable to expect a negative relationship between education and crime. However, there are 
specific criminal activities which could require high levels of education.    6 
productive and unproductive activities. In particular, more abundant rent seeking activities decrease 
the reward to productive entrepreneurship and distorts the allocation of talent. The dynamic version 
of the model, based on a overlapping generation framework, reinforces the idea that if a society 
inherits  an  adverse  allocation  of  talents  (and/or  reward  structure)  it  could  incur  in  a 
underdevelopment trap: a “rent-seeking” equilibrium.  
A recent study on socio-economic factors affecting the economic performance of Italian 
provinces by Peri (2004) shows that the presence of organized crime is “the single most important 
social variable negatively associated with economic development”. The author employs provincial 
murder rates to identify the presence of established and strong criminal organizations (mafias) and 
finds  that  provinces  characterized  by  a  very  high  murder  rate  (more  than  7  murders  per  100 
thousands  inhabitants  per  year)  have  a  per  capita  growth  rate  0.41%  lower  than  other  Italian 
provinces.  
What are the channels through which the presence of organized crime might negatively 
affects  the  local  economic  system?  Broadly  speaking  we  can  categorize  negative  externalities 
generated by organized crime into three groups. In the first group there are the negative effects that 
organized  crime  have  on  the  mobilization  of  local  resources  within  an  economic  system.  The 
presence  of  organize  crime  might  distort  the  “allocation”  of  talent  and  human  capital  toward 
unproductive  or  destructive  activities.  In  the  longer  run  this  distortion  is  likely  to  reduce  the 
incentive to accumulate skills and develop productive talent (as pointed out by Baumol 1990 and 
Acemoglu 1995).  Organized crime, through extortive activity, represents a “tax” on all productive 
activities; their strong presence might induce the owners of factors of production (capital but also 
labour) to relocate in other economies thus reducing the stock of local resources. Together with 
“flights” of productive physical and human capital, such negative externality might reduce incentive 
to accumulate resources since there is a risk of capture or destruction by members of mafia (Konrad 
and Skaperdas 1998). It is also important to notice that not only expected returns from investments 
might be lower in environment characterized by the presence of organized crime but also the cost of 
investment might be substantially higher. Empirical support on this hypothesis is provided by a 
recent work by Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009). The author uses a rich and detailed dataset on bank-firms 
relationship in Italy and shows that the cost of loans is significantly higher, banks require more 
collaterals and firms have a reduced access to credit in areas where crime rates (and in particular 
organized crime) are high. A corollary of these findings is that firms (and families) often are forced 
to borrow capital from a criminal organization with an extremely high probability of being trapped 
in usury and hence the likely consequences of handing to the same organization most of their 
assetts. 
  The presence of organized crime might also affects the mobilization of external resources. 
Daniele and Marani (2007) find that FDI inflows are discouraged in those Italian provinces where 
crimes typically associated to the presence of mafia have a high incidence. There are reasons to 
believe that organized crime could discourage also the inflow of human capital through immigration 
although to our knowledge no studies documents this hypothesis. 
  Other important costs imposed by mafia-style organizations to the local economy are linked 
to the production of public goods. The infiltrations of organized crime in public procurement have 
been extensively documented (for the case of ‘Ndrangheta see for instance Gratteri and Nicaso 
2007, Forgione 2009a).  The “involvement” of these organizations substantially increases the costs 
for the of local public goods and decreases their quality. An emblematic case of such effects is the 
construction of the Salerno – Reggio Calabria highway, the main transport infrastructure connecting 
Calabria to the rest of Italy; the cost per km of realization of this infrastructure has been estimated 
around 23,3 million Euros against the initially planned costs per km of 5.8 million Euros (Ciconte 
2008b;  Forgione  2009a  and  2009b).  The  mafia-control  upon  the  political  process  might  be 
considered one of the main determinants of the inefficient and costly provision of several key public 
services such as health, public transports, garbage collection in some municipalities of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno.    7 
4.  Organized crime and human capital: the case of ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria 
 
 
4.1 Growing in the shadow: the rise and expansion of ‘Ndrangheta  
 
The ‘Ndrangheta, based in Calabria, like the other three main Italian Mafias (“Cosa Nostra” in 
Siciliy, “Camorra” or “Sistema”  in Campania and “Sacra Corona Unita“ - Holy United Crown - in 
Apulia)  is  a  powerful  illegal  institution  which  owes  its  success  and  prosperity  to  the  shared 
(economic) interests of its members and to the cruel but efficient mechanisms of detection and 
punishment of affiliates deviating from the rules of solidarity and hierarchical obedience of the 
organization. 
However,  economic  interests  and  fear  of  punishment  are  not  the  only  strings  holding 
together this organization and making them the most secretive, rich and powerful Mafia in Italy: in 
fact the “secret of success” of the ‘Ndrangheta can be found in a peculiar mixture of modernity and 
antiquity.  The  ‘Ndrangheta  is  an  extremely  modern  criminal  organization  whose  investment 
strategy is flexible and very aggressive, always ready to take all the new opportunities and exploit 
new  “lines  of  business”  when  the  old  ones  are  not  anymore  profitable
3.  Interestingly,  all  this 
coexists with an archaic approach regarding family ties and kinship relations. According to some 
authors, what makes the ‘Ndrangheta such a mighty organisation is the fact that the criminal bonds, 
the solidarity and the obedience in this organisation are due mainly to “blood ties”, rather than (or 
together  with)  common  interests  and  fear  of  punishment.  For  this  reason  the  fight  against  this 
organization has been less successful than against the Sicilian Mafia or the Camorra in Campania. 
In fact the “pentitismo” – the cooperation with the authorities of ex-affiliates of the organization in 
exchange of some privileges in the judicial process – has been very limited for the ‘Ndrangheta: 
betraying the organization is often equivalent to a betrayal of the “family” and hence much more 
costly. According to many experts on the structure and history of the organization (Ciconte 2008; 
Forgione  2009a  and  2009;  Gratteri  and  Nicaso  2007),  these  strong  ties  have  allowed  the 
‘Ndrangheta to become a reliable partner of other criminal organizations all over the world and 
enabled  the  positioning  of  the  organization  as  leader  in  cocaine  trafficking  and  other  illicit 
international transactions (weapons, human smugglings etc). 
The meaning and origin of the word ‘Ndrangheta is mysterious and an investigation of it 
cannot  disentangle  reality  and  myth,  history  and  religion.  According  to  one  source  the  word 
‘Ndrangheta comes from the ancient Greek word andragathos meaning valorous men.
4 Furthermore 
the heritage of the ancient Greek civilization mixes together with anthropological elements coming 
from the Catholic religion: in fact the admission rituals of new members to the ‘Ndrangheta sees the 
presence of blood, ceremonial cuts, reading of the Gospel, all under the safeguard of Saint Michael, 
the Saint protector of the organisation. 
The first historical traces of the organization dates back to the XVI century, the period of the 
Spanish domination of the South of Italy, but it is only with the unification of the entire peninsula in 
a single state at the end of XIX century that the ‘Ndrangheta starts to concern the public authorities. 
Notwithstanding its ancient past of glory, prosperity and civilization, Calabria is today one of the 
most backward, underdeveloped and poor regions in Italy and in the entire Europe. Its GDP pro-
                                                 
3 For instance, between the 80s and the 90s the ‘Ndrangheta abandoned the kidnapping activity and heavily invested, 
together with the Colombian narcos, in the import of hard drugs in Italy and in the entire Europe. 
4 In fact the region of Calabria was part of the Magna Grecia (Greater Greece) since the 8
th century BC. In few small 
villages in Calabria the local spoken dialects are very close to the ancient Greek language. Traces of this word and 
similar words derived from it are in the province of Reggio Calabria where the word ‘ndraghitiari, from the ancient 
Greek verb andragatizomai means assuming proud, valorous but also jaunty behaviours. 
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capite (PPP) is equal to 67% of the EU-27 average in 2006 (Eurostat 2009). Nevertheless, the 
research centre Eurispes has estimated that the annual turnover of ‘Ndrangheta is equal to 3,4% of 
the Italian GDP, that is 35.700 million of euro in 2004, of which 22.300 millions of Euros come 
from the drugs traffic, making the ‘Ndrangheta the richest, the most liquid and the most powerful 
criminal organization in Italy and maybe in the world. The threat of seizure by the Italian authorities 
of this financial treasures and the need to recycle this massive amounts of resources has induced the 
heads of the organization – a few individuals out of the estimated 6 thousands affiliates – to invests 
abroad (or in other Italian regions).  
 
 
Figure 1 – The map of ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria 
 
  Source: Ciconte (2008) based on Italian Parliament XV Antimafia Commission 
 
Other  than  extremely  rich,  very  secretive  and  violent,  the  ‘Ndrangheta  is  also  a  “mass 
organisation”, in terms of number of affiliates: while the Sicilian Cosa Nostra has the smallest 
number  of  members,  both  in  absolute  terms  and  in  percentage  on  the  total  of  population,  the 
‘Ndrangheta  has  the  largest  number  of  affiliates  while  the  Campanian  Camorra  is  in  the 
intermediate position. According to the annual report of Confesercenti (2007) on Italian mafias, one 
every 345 inhabitants in Calabria is affiliated to the ‘Ndrangheta, the same figure for the Sicilian 
mafia is 1 in 903 inhabitants and for the Camorra in Campania 1 in 840 (Nicaso 2007). Although 
one  might  question  these  estimates,  the  evidence  of  a  wider  diffusion  of  the  phenomenon  in 
Calabria  seems  rather  robust.  The  backbone  of  the  organization  is  the  “family”  (of  group  of 
families; the so-called “locali”) which is rooted and (mainly) operates in a given local territory 
(often the area of a municipality). We can consider the ‘Ndrangheta as a federal organization where 
the so-called “locali” (family groups) are rather autonomous and have a high hierarchical internal 
organization.  The upper levels of the organization (for instance the ‘provincial council’) have just a 
role of coordination, partnership, design of common strategies, facilitation of risks and resources 
pooling (for instance to carry out important international drug transactions) and (when necessary) 
regulation of internal struggles and sanctioning of the breaking of federal rules. Figure 1 shows the 
map  of  municipalities  in  Calabria  where  -  according  to  the  Italian  Parliament  XV  Antimafia 
Commission – organized crime is based.    9 
The focus on Calabria in the present study is in our opinion interesting since although the spatial 
diffusion of ‘Ndrangheta is wide in all Calabrian provinces the grip of the organization is far from 
being  uniform.  Such  heterogeneous  presence  of  the  organization  in  an  area  otherwise  rather 
homogeneous in terms of economic and social characteristics calls for an analysis at the municipal 
level rather than provincial level.  
Summing up, the presence of the organization in Calabria is in many municipalities (but far 
from all of them) consolidated and pervasive since many decades and hence able to exert a strong 
distortive role through the channels described earlier. The consequence of this presence on human 




4.2 Organized crime and human capital: empirical strategy and data description  
 
 
In this section our aim is to investigate the role played by the (historical and pervasive) presence 
of a powerful criminal organization on human capital accumulation. We use Italian Census data 
from 1971 till 2001 to investigate the nexus between the “strong” presence of organized crime and 
human capital in 408 municipalities in Calabria. As a proxy for human capital, our dependent 
variable, we use the: 
(i)  Percentage  share  of  individuals  within  the  municipal  population  with  an  high-school 
diploma and above in 2001; 
(ii) Change in the share of highly educated individuals between 1971 and 2001.  
 
Thus our empirical strategy is to estimate the following equations:  
 
    (1) 
   
  (2) 
 
where  H  represents  our  measure  of  human  capital  accumulation  at  the  municipal  level ( i), 
OrgCrime is our variable which identifies the historical and strong presence of ‘Ndrangheta before 
the period considered, Pop is the municipal population and X a set of control variables that are 
expected to influence human capital formation in the municipality. Since, as suggested above, the 
change in the municipal population in the three decades here considered -   - might be 
strongly  influenced  by  the  presence  of  the  criminal  organization  we  estimate  the  model  using 
instrumental variables as well as ordinary least squares. Furthermore, the effects of organized crime 
on population dynamics (in particular migration) is an interesting question per se, and therefore we 
also estimates the following equation: 
 
     (3) 
 
In fact the economic and social costs imposed by the presence of organized crime might induce part 
of the population, and in particular those individuals who have invested in their human capital, to 
vote with their feet and leave the municipality. 
The  description  of  the  variables  employed  is  reported  in  Table  1.  The  identification  of  the 
presence of organized crime in a given municipality is a challenging task. Precise measures of the 
phenomenon are not available, in particular since we are not interested in the actual geography of 
the organization and the strength exercised over the municipal territory today – as depicted in 
Figure 1 - but our ideal measure should be able to capture the pervasive presence and strength of   10 
the organization during a sufficiently long period of time (hence for decades before the period 
considered in our study, 1971-2001). 
Our aim is to identify those municipalities where organized crime has played (and still plays) a 
relevant role in shaping the local economic and social environment and in turn in affecting the 
individual incentive to invest in human capital. We employ three different dummy variables in the 
analysis. The variable Organized Crime1 is equal to 1 if the criminal organization has been ‘active’ 
and has strongly influenced the economic and social life of the municipality over a long period of 
time. This variable has been compiled by the authors on the basis of an historical reconstruction of 
the  spatial  diffusion  of  ‘Ndrangheta.  Contributions  by  widely  acknowledged  experts  on  the 
historical origin and development of the criminal organization (Ciconte 2008a and 2008b; Forgione 
2009a and 2009b; Gratteri and Nicaso 2007) have been used along with direct sources such has 
historical officials documents and reports of the Italian Parliament, Ministry of Interior Affairs, 
Ministry of Justice etc. This historical reconstruction of the organization allowed us to identify 55 
municipalities  (mainly  located  in  the  province  of  Reggio  Calabria)  where  the  presence  of 
‘Ndrangheta has been pervasive in the last half century (and in some cases since the end of the 
eighteenth century). With the approval of the Law n. 221/1991 the Italian Parliament introduced the 
possibility for the central government to remove the municipal council in case of mafia infiltration. 
This law represented an important step in the fight against organized crime since allowed “external 
control” over local territories where the border between criminality and politics is highly porous. 
More than 30 municipalities in Calabria have been subject to the application of Law n. 221/1991 
and we use this information for creating the dummy variable “Dissolved municipal council” (equal 
to 1 if the municipal council has been removed from power by the central government). In our 
opinion this allows us to identify those areas where organized crime is powerful and embedded in 
local society so as to be able not only to deeply influence the political process but of being be part 
of it. Our preferred measure for identifying a deep and pervasive presence of organized crime is the 
variable  Organized  Crime2  which  is  a  merge  of  the  two  above-described  dummies  variables 
Organized Crime1 and Dissolved municipal council.
5 
   Among  the  other  covariates  employed  in  the  analysis  we  include  a  dummy  variable  - 
arbereshe  - which is equal to 1 for those municipalities where there is a strong presence of an 
Albanian-origin  ethnic  community.  As  a  consequence  of  the  Ottoman  invasion  of  Albania, 
culminated with the death of Skanderberg, the Albanian national hero in 1468, a large number of 
individuals fled from the Ottoman invasion of Albania. Between XV and XVII centuries more than 
50 arbereshe communities (Albanian ethnic minorities) were formed and scattered around in the 
South of Italy. Many of these communities were formed in Calabria and even if several centuries 
have passed their language
6 and cultural traditions are still preserved by locals. This strong sense of 
belonging to the ethnic communities of (ancient) Albanian origins represents a peculiar form of 
social capital. We investigate in our analysis whether this form of ‘local social capital’ matters in 
the process of human capital formation. The hypothesis is that the level of “trust” within the ethnic 
minority  might  provide  a  stronger  incentive  to  invest  in  education  in  a  process  similar  to  that 
described by La Porta et al (1997). 
 
 
                                                 
5 We do not use official statistics on declared crimes for three main reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of consistent 
historical data on judiciary/crime statistics. Secondly, available official statistics are reported only for highly aggregated 
geographical level (region or provinces) which we believe are not fully adequate for the high heterogeneity in the 
presence of such organizations. Peri (2004) for instance uses as a proxy for the presence of organized crime the murder 
rate for 100.000 inhabitants in 1951 (regional level) or in 1971 and later (provincial level). No such data exists to our 
knowledge at municipal level. Thirdly, most of declared crimes suffers from a serious problems of under-reporting; this 
is even more true in areas where organized crime is often more powerful (and quicker in enforcing its rules) than the 
State. 
6 Arberesh language derives from tosk, a dialect once spoken in Southern Albania, and is substantially different from 
current albanian.    11 
Table 1 – Description of the variables employed in the empirical analysis 
 




Dependent variables.       
Higher Education in 2001  Percentage of municipal (or Local Labour System, LLS) 
population with secondary or tertiary education in 2001 
26.75 (7.45)  Census Data (Istat) 
Higher  Education  change  1971- 
2001 
Percentage  change  in  the  municipal  share  of  highly 
educated individuals between 1971 and 2001 
23.17 ( 3.65)  Census Data (Istat) 
Population  change  between  1971 
and 2001 
Percentage change in the municipal population between 
1971 and 2001 
-7.13 (32.37)  Census Data (Istat) 
 
Covariates  employed  in  the 
regression analysis 
     
       
Organized crime 1  Dummy variable equals 1 if the presence of organized 
crime  has  been  strong  and  pervasive  before  1971. 
Municipalities  are  included  only  if  reliable 
documentation  exists  on  multiple  and  significant 
episodes of organized crime influences in the economic 
and social life. 
.135 (.342)  Authors’ elaboration (1) 
Municipality  controlled  by 
Ndrangheta 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the municipal council has 
been  subject  to  an  order  of  dismissal  based  on  the 
application  of  Law  n.  221/1991  (“Normativa  sullo 
scioglimento  dei  consigli  comunali  per  presunte 
infiltrazioni mafiose”). 
.086 (.280)  Authors’  elaboration 
based  on  Gazzetta 
Ufficiale  della 
Repubblica  Italiana 
(several years) 
Organized crime 2  Merge between the two variables “Organized crime 1” 
and “Municipality controlled by Ndrangheta” 
.167 (.373)  Authors’ elaboration (see 
above) 
Arbereshe (Albanian origin)  Dummy variable equals 1 if the municipality population 
still preserves arbereshe language and traditions. 
.074 (.261)  Authors’ elaboration 
Secondary Education in 1971  Share  of  municipal  population  with  high-school 
diploma in 1971 (%) 
4.540 (1.993)  Census Data (Istat) 
Tertiary Education in 1971  Share of municipal population with university diploma 
and above in 1971 (%) 
.775 (.529)  Census Data (Istat) 
Higher Education in 1971  Percentage  of  municipal  population  with  secondary 
and/or tertiary education  
26.749 (7.452)  Census Data (Istat) 
Higher  Education  attainment  in  the 
Local Labour System in 1971  
Percentage of LLS’s population with secondary and/or 
tertiary education  
49.295 (5.882)  Census Data (Istat) 
Illiteracy  rate  in  the  Local  Labour 
System (1971) 
Rate of illiteracy within the Local Labour System (LLS) 
where the municipality is located. 
16.138 (3.751)  Census Data (Istat) 
Unemployment rate in 1971   Percentage  of  the  municipal  population  which  is 
actively searching for a job in 1971 
2.982 (1.092)  Census Data (Istat) 
Employment rate in 1971 (%)  Percentage  of  the  municipal  population  which  is 
employed in 1971 
43.346 (7.496)  Census Data (Istat) 
Employment  rate  change  1971  – 
2001 
Percentage  change  in  the  municipal  employment  rate 
between 1971 and 2001.  
-12.295 (7.71)  Census Data (Istat) 
Public sector   Share of public employment over total employment at 
the municipal level (% in 1981) 
32.761 (10.817)  Census Data (Istat) 
Migrants in 1971 (population absent 
for work, % share) 
Share of the municipal population working outside the 
municipal area in 1997 (%) 
6.706 (4.179)  Census Data (Istat) 
Population in 1971  (log  of)  Number  of  individuals  residing  in  the 
municipality in 1971  
4872.67  ( 
11438.19) 
Census Data (Istat) 
Population in 1971 - squared  Square of “Population in 1971”      Census Data (Istat) 
Population  in  the  Local  Labour 
System in 1971 
(log of) Number of individuals residing within the Local 
labour System in 1971 
60830.97    
(63644.02) 
Census Data (Istat) 
Altitude  Average altitude of the municipal area (in meters)  419.1 (227.3)  Istat 
Highway SA_RC  Dummy  variable  equals  to  1  if  the  municipality  is 
crossed by the main regional highway (Salerno-Reggio 
Calabria) 
.453 (.498)  Authors’ elaboration 
(1) Historical reconstructions made by the authors on the basis of multiple sources (in particular the following sources - and references 




There is overwhelming evidence on the importance of parents’ background (income and education)   12 
as  a  key  determinant  of  children’  investments  in  education  -  estimates  of  the  elasticity  for 
intergenerational mobility in education lie between  0.25 to 0.40 in the UK (Dearden et al 1997). 
The low intergenerational mobility in education in Italy is well documented in Checchi et al 1999.  
In order to take this effect into account we include as a covariate the share of highly educated 
individuals in the municipal population before the period of analysis here considered. In some 
specification we also control for the level of education in the Local Labour System
7 where the 
municipality  is  located,  in  order  to  capture  spatial  effects  in  the  process  of  human  capital 
accumulation from neighbouring municipalities. We expect a positive relationship between past 
levels of education - reflecting the human capital accumulation of past generations - and actual 
levels (and changes). 
We use past and/or contemporaneous population dynamics (in or out- migration) as a general 
proxy for economic and social opportunities at the municipal level since individuals move out from  
locations which offers poor opportunities. Poor or scarce opportunities, ceteris paribus, will also 
imply  a  reduced  incentive  to  invest  in  human  capital;  we  hence  expect  a  negative  (positive) 
relationship  between  outmigration  (immigration)  and  the  share  of  highly  educated  individuals 
within the population. The negative association between outmigration and human capital is also 
reinforced by a “composition” effect due to the fact that migration flows are generally positively 
self-selected since the most talented and skilled individuals have a higher propensity to migrate.  
Calabria has historically been a land of emigration; the outflows were particularly intense in two 
historical periods (i) the decades after the Italian reunification (toward the New World, US, Canada, 
Australia and South American countries and other European countries); (ii) during the post-WWII 
reconstruction toward the industrial poles located in the North of Italy. In the following analysis we 
use a measure of past migration flows from the municipality by employing an information available 
in the 1971 Census; more precisely the number of residents absent from the municipality in 1971 
for work reasons (migrants in 1971). The expected sign of this variable is ambiguous since it might 
represents  a  lack  of  opportunities  in  the  local  labour  market  but  might  also  generate  positive 
diaspora externalities since migration might promote development in the areas of origin through 
remittances, return migration, innovation flows or trade. 
We also control for the unemployment and/or employment rate at the municipal level in the 
considered period and the share of public sector jobs over total employed. The latter variable is 
expected to be negatively associated with our measures of human capital since the higher the value 
of this variable the lower is the number of jobs opportunities created by the private sector within the 
municipality considered. Other controls includes the accessibility of the municipality through the 
main  transport  corridor  in  the  region  (the  highway  Salerno-Reggio  Calabria)  and  the  average 
altitude of municipal area. We also included several control variables as a proxy of the (municipal 
and/or Local Labour System) supply of education such as the presence of high schools or the 





4.3 Empirical results 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 report the results of the econometric analysis on the determinants of municipal 
high education respectively in levels in 2001 and the change between 1971 and 2001. The first 
columns  use  the  alternative  organized  crime  indicators  presented  above.  In  what  follows  we 
                                                 
7 A Local Labour System (Sistema Locale del Lavoro) is defined by Istat (Italian National Office of Statistics) by an 
area, usually encompassing several municipalities, where labor supply and demand are largely self-contained; hence an 
area within which commuting takes place (see www.istat.it for details). 
8  This  result  is  probably  due  to  the  high  homogeneity  of  these  variable  within  the  regional  area.  Estimations  are 
available from the authors upon request.   13 
concentrate our discussion on the last column of each table where we use our preferred measure and 






Table 2 – The determinants of the level of municipal human capital accumulation in 2001 
(dependent variable: % of municipal population with at least a high-school diploma in 2001) 
 
  Model 1 (OLS)  Model 2 (OLS)  Model 3 (OLS)  Model 4 (IV) 
Organized crime 1  -1.765* 
(0.775) 
     
Municipality  controlled  by 
Ndrangheta 
  -1.962* 
(0.890) 
   
















































































Observations  408  408  408  408 
Adj R-squared  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.56 
Wu-Hausman test        F(1,397)=6.11 
Note: + significant at 10%;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses 
Variable instrumented: Population change 1971-2001 (%)  / instruments: municipal population with at least high-school diploma in 
1971, population in the Local Labour System (LLS) with at least high-school diploma in 1971, Migrants in 1971 (population absent for 
work in 1971, % share), organized crime 2, altitude of municipality, employment rate in 1971, population in 1971 and its square, 
population in LLS in 1971. 
 
 
The  coefficients  of  our  proxies  for  the  presence  of  organized  crime  are  always  negative  and 
statistically significant suggesting that municipalities where such perverse form of social capital is 
pervasive accumulate less human capital. Our result suggests that organized crime is costly for 
hosting society not only in terms of short-term distortion or destruction of resource but also since it 
undermines the prospects of future growth by depleting human capital. It is interesting to notice that 
the variable arbereshe is significant and positive; this findings seems to suggest a tale of two stories 
related to social capital in the considered case study. On one side there is a positive story where 
trust, social cohesion within a community of individuals who shares a common cultural origin, 
positively affects the accumulation of human capital. On the other side there is a perverse social 
externality, organized crime, which corrupts the accumulation of fundamental resources for growth.   14 
  The level of education within the municipal population or in the surrounding areas (LLSs) at 
the beginning of the period, in 1971, is always positive and significant confirming the hypothesis of 
low intergenerational mobility in educational levels. In addition, those municipalities characterized 
by a growing population within the period considered have a relatively higher rate of accumulation 
of human capital. This might be due both to a higher incentive to invest in education or to the fact 
that immigrants are very often positive self-selected (i.e. higher educated). A similar finding is 
associated  to  the  variable  employment  rate  between  1971  and  2001;  while  in  Table  2  the 
unemployment rate in 1971, another proxy for economic opportunities, is negative but not always 
significant.  Municipalities  characterized  by  a  high  share  of  public  sector  employment  are 
characterized by a lower level of formal education within the population. Often low profile public 





Table 3 – The determinants of the change of municipal human capital between 1971 and 2001 
(dependent variable: change in the municipal population with at least a high-school diploma 2001-1971) 
 
  Model 1 (OLS)  Model 2 (OLS)  Model 3 (OLS)  Model 4 (OLS)  Model 5 (TSLS) 
Organized crime 1  -1.252** 
(0.431) 
       
Municipality  controlled  by 
Ndrangheta 
  -1.019* 
(0.502) 
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Highway SA_RC        -0.88** (0.28)   
Constant  5.732** (1.532)  5.54** (1.538)  5.772** (1.531)  5.59** (1.51)  5.417** (1.494) 
           
Observations  408  408  408  408  408 
Adj R-squared  0.43  0.42  0.43  0.44  0.42 
Note: + significant at 10%;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses 




                                                 
9 The allocation of employment opportunities in the public sector is often in these areas more related to “relationship” 
capital (family and friends connections) rather than individual skills and abilities.   15 
What is the main channel linking organized crime and human capital accumulation? One 
potential answer comes from the results reported in Table 4. In fact a strong local presence of 
organized crime is associated with a reduction in the municipal population between 1971 and 2001. 
Given the marginal role played by municipal differences in natural demographic change (fertility 
and mortality rates); most of the population adjustment is due to migration flows. The selective 
nature of outflows of migrants can be considered one of the main channels through which human 




Table 4 – Organized crime and population growth between 1971 and 2001 
(dependent variable: change in the municipal population 2001-1971) 
 
  Model 1 (OLS) 
Organized crime 2 (merge)  -10.358**  (3.903) 
Arbereshe (Albanian origin)  -7,031 (4.999) 
Population in 1971 (log)  0.001* (0.000) 
Population in 1971 – square  0.0001** (0.000) 
Migrants in 1971 (population absent for work in 1971, % share)  -1.206** (0.323) 
Employment rate in 1971 (%)  3.049** (0.312) 
Employment rate (% change 1971-2001)  3.263** (0.308) 
Altitude of municipalità  -0.028** (0.006) 
Population in 1971 (Local labour system)  0.0001** (0.000) 
Constant  -87.065** (11.561) 
   
Observations  408 
Adj R-squared  0.37 
Note: + significant at 10%;* significant at 5%;  
** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Other covariates relevant in explaining population changes are the level of employment rate 
at  the  beginning  of  the  period  and  its  subsequent  change.  The  initial  size  of  the  municipal’s 
population  (and  its  square)  and  that  of  the  Local  Labour  System’  population  are  positively 
associated with subsequent changes suggesting a process of concentration in larger centres which is 
common to the path observed in other Italian regions. We observe also a pattern of depopulation in 
municipalities located at higher altitude, often small and isolated villages in hilly or mountain  areas 
of the region. 
 
 
5.  Conclusive remarks 
 
Organized crime has profound effects on the economy and society not only because it leads to a 
misallocation of resources and to a reduction of the quality of life in the short period but also 
because it compromises economic growth and human improvement in a long run perspective. The 
great bulk of the literature has investigated the economic approach to crime by analysing economic 
determinants  of  criminal  behaviour  in  terms  of  incentives  and  opportunities.  A  less  abundant 
amount of studies has focussed on costs of criminal activities in terms of adverse mobilization of 
local and external resources and downgrading in the provision of public goods. Few contributions 
have explored the influence of organized crime on economic development. Although the long run   16 
consequences of criminal infiltration in the economy are less easily observable and have a less 
sensationalistic  impact  on  public  opinion,  we  believe  that  the  study  of  such  consequences  is 
fundamental  in  order  to  better  understand  the  structural  damages  caused  to  the  economy  by 
organized crime and design adequate policies of crime deterrence.  
In this paper we provide evidence of a significant relationship between organized crime and 
human  capital  accumulation,  the  engine  of  economic  growth.  We  investigate  the  case  of 
‘Ndrangheta, the powerful criminal organization whose illegal activities are spread worldwide but, 
at the same time, are deeply rooted in the local territory of Calabria, a southern Italian region. 
Whereas existing studies on the economic role of organized crime in Italy use data at the regional or 
provincial  level,  we  assume  municipalities  of  Calabria  as  units  of  analysis  since  territorial 
differentiation of ‘Ndrangheta’s presence in  Calabria can be captured at this level of disaggregation 
only.   
We  employ  three  different  dummy  variables  for  indicating  the  long  standing  presence  of 
criminal organization in the economic and social life of municipality. When we regress levels (or 
change) in high education on crime variables we always find negative and statistically significant 
coefficients.  A  similar  outcome  is  obtained  when  change  in  population  is  used  as  dependent 
variables in the place of high education. In other words, empirical results suggest that organized 
crime determines a deterioration in human capital formation through two modalities: on the one 
hand, a strong presence of organized crime poisoning local economy might force more educated 
individuals to migrate (human flights effect); on the other hand, individual incentives to invest in 
human capital might be sharply distorted if criminal institution influences pervasively economic 
activities in the territory (dis-incentive effect).  
In general, our results are strongly supportive of the link between social capital and human 
capital formation, even if organized crime is a perverse form of social capital.  
It is interesting to notice that the link “social capital/human capital” is curiously confirmed in our 
results when we look at the reversal of the coin: municipalities preserving Arbereshe (Albanian) 
language and traditions are almost immune from infiltration of ‘Ndrangheta and are positively 
correlated with human capital formation; in this case, virtuous social capital - characterized by 
reciprocal trust and social cohesion inside a community of individuals sharing common cultural 
origins - has a positive impact on education.  
In agenda of future research, the innovative content of the present work - consisting in the 
investigation of the link between organized crime and human capital accumulation – should be 
developed in line with three directions: i) the design of a formal theoretical model aiming to better 
understand all implications of the nexus between organized crime, human capital formation and 
migration; ii) the improvement of the identification of organized crime variable according to a 
quantitative  measure  of  the  phenomenon,  other  than  the  qualitative  indicator  here  adopted  (for 
example, historical murder rates, historical extension of latifondo
10 as form of landownership, etc.); 
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